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The Culture of Financial Institutions; the Institution of
Political Economy
David A. Westbrook1
An expert's questions tend to be bounded by the expert's claim to special
knowledge, i.e., expertise, and usually institutional accreditation. So it is
unsurprising that when experts who think about the regulation of financial
institutions are asked to think about "culture," the issue tends to be framed in their
terms (what we know, or at least think we learned in graduate school or in the
course of our professional careers). For example, how should regulators confront
the culture within a financial institution so that the institution performs in
accordance with societal norms, even when the law is unclear? This is a good
question (the answer is seven), and as Justin O'Brien's and George Gilligan's
excellent "Introduction" to this book makes clear, variations on the question have
been heard in recent years across the financial world.

Director of Global Strategic Initiatives, Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar
and Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School, State University of New York, and
author OUT OF CRISIS: RETHINKING OUR FINANCIAL MARKETS, Paradigm Press (2009). The
thoughts expressed here were first aired as a keynote for a conference given by the
law firm of Allens and the University of New South Wales Centre for Law, Markets
and Regulation, "Regulating Culture: Compliance, Risk Management and
Accountability in the Aftermath of LIBOR," Sydney, October 26, 2012. I thank the
participants for many thoughtful comments. I also thank Justin O'Brian for the
invitation to speak, and Jack Schlegel and Douglas Holmes for good reads on short
notice. Sean O'Brien provided excellent, and speedy, research help, for which I am
grateful. That talk was published, in slightly more polished form, as David A.
Westbrook, ‘Neofeudalism, Paraethnography and the Custodial Regulation of
Financial Institutions,’ (forthcoming) JASSA: The Finisia Journal of Applied Finance.
Any failings are my responsibility.
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As with all ordinary science, much is assumed, as the Introduction also
demonstrates.2 The model question posed above assumes that we know what
financial industries are, and what purposes their regulation serves. Not so long ago,
for example, it seemed pretty clear what a bank is, and what the central bank's
responsibilities toward such institutions are. This is no longer the case; we now
speak not only of shadow banking, but the central bank as dealer of last resort,3 and
we observe a pronounced unwillingness to follow Baghehot's advice and let
insolvent banks fail.4 Nor can it be said that we are clear on just what "societal
norms" financial institutions are to serve. Sticking with central banking (and by
extension, the banking industry in operation) do we think that monetary policy
ought to be conducted in accordance with real economic, as opposed to monetary,
goals?5 For another set of examples, it is easy enough (tautological) to say that
fraud is bad, but when we get down to brass tacks -- what disclosure is required
under what circumstances, or else the transaction be deemed fraudulent, with
financial and even criminal consequences? -- little agreement exists.
To large extent such mindlessness must be forgiven under the flag of
Neurath's boat, which must be rebuilt even while it is at sea.6 We cannot pay
attention to everything at once, and if we seek to address something as nebulous as
"culture" in financial regulation, assumptions are going to have to be made. But it
should also be acknowledged that our assumptions also may be convenient, or
otherwise intellectually dubious. So before we stride off into the rough of financial
See generally Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1996).
3 See Perry Mehrling, The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of
Last Resort (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011).
4 Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market, (London,
Henry S. King and Co., 1873) 101-03.
5 See Charles Goodhart, Central Banks Walk Inflation’s Razor Edge, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/744e4a96-661c-11e2-b967-00144feab49a.html .
6 Otto Neurath, Logical Positivism (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1959) 201. The
image was later taken up by the Harvard philosopher W.V.O Quine. See W.V.O
Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1960) 3-4. My
thanks to Vitor Gaspar.
2

Page 2

David A. Westbrook
Culture of Financial Institutions; Institution of Political Economy
February 18, 2013
institution regulation, and what has or has not been learned from the global
financial crisis, and what "culture" might mean, at least for the purposes of
preventing or at least containing the fire next time, it is worth pausing to reflect on
the fact that financial culture is not only, or even most importantly, the culture
within financial industries, including of course their customers and regulators. That
is, the most important part of financial culture may have very little to do with that
on which we, as experts of one sort or another, are authorized to speak. "I'm sorry
about the cancer, ma'am, but I'm a podiatrist."
Financial culture also is the product of financial industries; it is the heart of
contemporary political economy, what I have elsewhere called the City of Gold.7
The GFC matters in a way that, for example, the Silicon Valley bubble did not, not
merely because of the former's scale, but because the mismanagement of financial
institutions led to the disruption of so many human relationships, most obviously
employment relationships. Unemployment -- or lack of employment opportunities - blights a generation. Unemployment correlates with suicide, divorce, and
addiction rates.8 With massive unemployment (or worse, little employment
prospects for the young, energetic, and sometimes violent) we may see a loss of faith
in social institutions, a rise in ethnic animosity and virulent nationalism, an
anarchist moment. "The best lack all conviction, while the worst/ Are full of
passionate intensity," as Yeats has it.9 This year, 2013, does not appear to be 1913,
nor even 1933, though the situation in Southern Europe remains particularly
dismaying. But to say that history teaches that things can be worse is a pathetic
See David A. Westbrook, City of Gold: An Apology for Global Capitalism in a Time of
Discontent (New York, Routledge, 2004).
8 See Dean Baker & Kevin Hassett, ‘The Human Disaster of Unemployment,’ (May 12,
2012) The New York Times, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/opinion/sunday/the-human-disaster-ofunemployment.html?pagewanted=all; Liana Sayer, Paul England, Paul Allison &
Nicole Kangas, ‘She Left He Left: How Unemployment and Satisfaction Affect
Women’s and Men’s Decisions to Leave Marriage (May, 2011) 6 American Journal of
Sociology 116, 1982-2018; Dieter Henkel, ‘Unemployment and Substance Use: A
Review of the Literature’ (2011) 1 Current Drug Reviews 4, 4-11.
9 William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming (1921).
7
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excuse. Members of the financial community (or at least its talking heads) tend to
be all too blithe about recent colossal failures, and the harm that has been inflicted
not only on "the little people," but also on the structures that sustain the lives of the
privileged.
Understanding financial culture, and the failings of the global financial crisis,
in social terms does more than to remind us of the human significance of events,
significance that is perhaps easy to forget in technical discourses on institutional
regulation. Indeed part of the point of this or any other expert discourse (consider
here medicine, or the military) is to be able to discuss fraught questions, such as
cancers, bombs, or indeed insolvencies, as if they were merely objective. And in
recent years the discipline of economics has struggled to define itself in scientific
terms, understood to be concerned with objects, and thus in some sense outside of
culture and by extension politics. So, from an economic perspective, one may speak
of, for familiar examples, the independence of central banking, or a "technical"
government, or make the claim that while it is clear what reforms need to be made,
the problems are political.
But from the more traditional and perhaps defensible perspective of political
economy, finance is social in the structural sense used by sociologists and
anthropologists. Our financial institutions are absolutely central to the way we as
people conduct ourselves and understand our lives. This may be most obvious in
the United States, where so many social goods, including much education, health
care, and retirement, are provided through institutions directly dependent on
portfolio investment. But as the European debt crisis makes clear, in countries
where social obligations are met by the state, governments are quite dependent on
healthy financial markets, in turn dependent on healthy "private" (!) financial
institutions. Other examples abound. We securitize fixed assets. We pay for daily
operations through credit arrangements, both as individuals (credit cards) and
businesses (commercial lending and paper). As both individuals and especially
institutions, we are comfortable with leverage, exchange rate risk, and all sorts of
other dangers, in large part because we have developed derivative markets intended
Page 4
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to hedge our risks. One could go on, but in short, we have capitalized our worlds -this is what it means to have a "social capitalism."10 To put the matter differently: if
the GFC represents a colossal failure of finance, it also demonstrates just how
successful finance has been in monetizing contemporary economies, so that it seems
rather quaint to talk about the distribution of goods and services and the problem of
scarcity.
Thus while we still tend to teach finance in entrepreneurial terms (finance is
progressive, because it allows people to do what they cannot do out of retained
earnings), credit -- sweet liquidity -- is absolutely central to daily operations of
leveraged (and interconnected, and vulnerable) governments, institutions and
individuals. All of this makes the spectacle of young bucks at Barclays promising
one another bottles of champagne in exchange for modest market manipulation11
seem like a farce, but symptomatic -- Marie Antoinette dressing up as a shepherd.
And this makes financial regulation an essentially custodial, or as is said in the
banking context (now including the securities context)12 "prudential," enterprise,
like the provision of electricity or water.
At this point, the expert debate on the regulation of financial institutions
does not seem so harmless. Without being sentimental, at issue is not merely how
banks and other financial institutions are to be run, but our political economy, i.e.,
little questions like whether kids in Spain will ever get a job, or just how many
people in the US will be on food stamps. It would be intellectually convenient to say,
with Foucault, that our claims to expert knowledge are also assertions of authority,
power.13 While there is a truth here, this point is easily overdone: bureaucrats want
to live comfortably, which requires a modicum of authority, but not power in the
David A. Westbrook, ‘Dinner Parties During 'Lost Decades': On the Difficulties of
Rethinking Financial Markets, Fostering Elite Consensus, and Renewing Political
Economy,’ Seattle Law Review (September 15, 2012) 29-32, Forthcoming.
11 Report From The Treasury Committee of Parliament, Fixing LIBOR: Some
Preliminary Findings (August 18, 2012).
12 See Mehrling, The New Lombard Street (2011).
13 Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York, Pantheon, 1977) 184.
10
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sheer rushing sense of being Alexander. Few bureaucrats, including bankers, seek
to conquer India or even be the big swinging dicks legend has it stalk Wall Street.14
More modestly, in bureaucratic fashion, we might ask, if social capitalism is the
"culture" of which financial institutions are the mainspring, then what sort of social
capitalism may be hoped? That is, if we ask about the culture of our political
economy, then what does that teach us about the culture we seek to foster in our
financial institutions?
*`

*

*

Regulators have turned to "culture" in frustration.15 Through the GFC and
now again with the LIBOR scandal, we observe market participants who simply do
not abide by the spirit of the rules. 16 They are, in a word, bad sports. So how do we
as a society -- and in particular regulators, charged with refereeing the markets -get financiers to be good sports? Or as a recent conference given by the law firm of
Allens and the University of New South Wales Center on Law, Markets and
Regulation phrased it, how do we regulate culture?17
In policy discourse, culture is commonly approached in two basic ways, both
centered on the notion of assessing the significance of an action vis-a-vis a social
frame of reference, the "culture."
Lawyers tend to think of culture on the model of law, conceived of as a rule.
So, cultures establish rules. Big general rules are expressed as laws (statutes,
judicial decisions, constitutions); technical administrative rules are usually called
See e.g., Tom Wolfe, The Bonfire of the Vanities (New York, Picador, 1987).
See ‘Regarding Culture: Compliance, Risk Management and Accountability in the
Aftermath of LIBOR,’ (Oct. 26, 2012) The Centre for Law, Markets, and Regulation.
16 See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Michael Kraten, Albert D. Metz, and Gim S. Seow,
‘LIBOR Manipulation?’ (2011) 36 JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE 1, 136-150; see also
François Laurens, ‘UK Banking Regulatory and Market Framework: Post-Crisis
Reform,’ (July 2012) Swiss Management Centre (SMC) University.
17 See Westbrook, Neofeudalism, Paraethnography, and the Custodial Regulation of
Financial Institutions, supra note 1.
14
15
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regulations; the softest and most "cultural" rules are deemed norms, e.g., best
practices, which may be important even in the absence of an official sanction. In this
view, law is often understood to bound otherwise free behavior, much as a fence
bounds movement. The law determines a "line," it is often said, which is not to be
crossed. As with borders, the metes and bounds of real estate and mining claims,
the claims of patents -- the imaginary of the "line" is ubiquitous in the law -- the lines
of financial regulation are themselves invisible. They are products of statute,
regulation, and best guesses as to, as Holmes wrote, "what the judge will do in fact" - and as such are subject to professional divination (funny how Holmes's emphasis
on "fact" so quickly requires "divination" -- faith and a gift).18 In consequence,
entrepreneurs often seek legal advice, and lawyers themselves may turn to
regulators, e.g., by seeking a no-action letter at the SEC, for some sense of where the
law's lines are. If, however, a transaction is deemed to be within the fence, then the
actor is free to take the action. This imaginary is familiar, useful, indeed inescapable
-- but it must be recognized as only one way of imagining the law.
Economists tend to begin with rational actors who are incessantly
attempting to better their situations. When contemplating an action, such actors
evaluate the benefits (incentives) and harms (disincentives) they are likely to
receive from taking, or not taking, the action. Many incentives are determined by
other people. For example, a bank might not want to be known to take
unreasonable risks, because a reputation for recklessness might dissuade people
from depositing money or otherwise investing in the bank. In extreme cases, a bank
could lose its license. So, for the bank, the immediate expected profit (return on
investment) must be balanced against somewhat more nebulous reputational risk if
the investment goes bad, and people find out.
If lawyers unsurprisingly imagine culture to be like law, and imagine law as
drawing lines that constrain otherwise free behavior, economist unsurprisingly
imagine culture as a market, presenting opportunities and imposing costs on
See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law
Review 457.
18
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rational actors. Both approaches fundamentally externalize culture as something to
be confronted by actors, as outside the actors, like weather. Neither approach
understands culture to constitute market actors, or more especially the institutions
that empower people to operate at all. (One cannot do a merger in the state of
nature.) To be blunt, financial policy discourse tends to have a very shallow
understanding of culture. There are exceptions, of course, and not to be unkind, but
people with profound understandings of the significance of things tend to occupy
themselves with endeavors other than the manipulation of money. And it was
precisely the shallow understanding of financial culture regnant in financial
discourse -- culture reduced to the black letter rules of endless yet ineffectual
financial regulation, and the undue faith that self-interest, including reputational
cost, would serve to discipline risk-taking -- that, we were told by Greenspan and
others, would ensure the soundness of our financial markets.19 Suffice it to say, such
weak thinking has been of little help in recent years. Clearly, if financial culture is to
be a part of the solution, then a more serious understanding of financial culture is
required.
So how might we begin to think about financial culture? We might begin by
thinking not about "culture" in the abstract, but as found in specific situations.
Indeed, not only does "culture" resist final definition, as O'Brien and Gilligan note in
the Introduction, but much anthropology of the contemporary does not even try.20
None of the cultural anthropologists with whom I speak make any attempt to define
"culture" objectively and externally. Instead, one attempts to understand this or that
"present situation"21 (other frequently heard words are "assemblage" and
"constellation") -- my friend Doug Holmes' forthcoming work on central bankers is

See Chairman Allan Greenspan, Remarks before the 31st Annual Conference on
Bank Structure and Competition (May 11, 1995).
20 O’Brien & Gilligan, Introduction at.
21 David A. Westbrook, Navigators of the Contemporary, Why Ethnography Matters
(The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008) 27-28.
19
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exemplary.22 In this view, culture is a placeholder for a web of understandings in
which both anthropologists and their interlocutors are implicated. So for example,
we might look at actors surrounding LIBOR: the various reporting banks (including
investment bankers, traders, and directors, to say nothing of shareholders,
depositors and other investors, as well as counterparties); the British Bankers
Association, Thompson Reuters, the regulators broadly construed, including not just
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Bank of England, but ultimately
Parliament itself; and perhaps most importantly, those who use LIBOR, and those
who study it, including the ethnographer herself, with her capacities, limitations,
and interests.
To put it differently, LIBOR may be understood not as an objective fact (that
is self-evidently naive, or should be by now), but as a collective narrative about the
expected cost of various forms of capital. Contemporary economies evidently need
a collective narrative about the future cost of capital, more prosaically known as a
benchmark.23 A serious ethnographic inquiry into how such a tale is told could be
useful. Such an inquiry might even help legislators in their task of encouraging
more reliable tellings.
As suggested above, however, we also could begin our inquiry into financial
culture from the outside, rather than the inside, of financial institutions. We might
begin by thinking about financial culture in terms of their artifacts, the products of
financial institutions that we use every day, and that shape the way we live. In other
words, we might think about financial culture in terms of political economy writ
large, as that which financial institutions institute, make: our commercial society.
So how does finance work in the social world? For purposes of discussion,
entertain the following proposition: the Occupy Wall Street movement considered
(perhaps generously) as argument, was descriptively correct and normatively
See Douglas R. Holmes, Economy of Words: Communicative imperatives in Central
Banks (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2013).
23 See Martin Wheatley, ‘The Wheatley Review of LIBROR,’ (2012) The Financial
Services Authority.
22
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incorrect. That is, Occupy Wall Street was right to complain about the 1% (or better,
less); substantial material inequality in fact inheres in contemporary market
societies. Consider further the possibility that, despite regnant ideologies of
autonomy and equality, our fundamental social structures cannot plausibly be
discussed in those terms. To be blunt, Occupy Wall Street was normatively wrong to
believe that our society -- that any financial society, including proudly egalitarian
Nordic ones -- is fundamentally about equality and autonomy.
Progress, as Henry Sumner Maine famously wrote, consisted in the historical
movement from societies in which order was defined by status or birth, to societies
in which order was defined by contract.24 This is as succinct a definition of liberal
modernity as one might wish, and its connections to commercial ideology are both
visible to this day and well documented.25 But suppose that finance does not work
that way. Suppose that in moving from an economy of goods and services to an
economy of money, and from the antithesis of capital and labor familiar since Marx
to social capitalism, we have also moved from contract to status as the foundation of
social order. Suppose we are neo-feudal, and have not yet awoken to our lives?
A full account, much less defense, of this idea would require a book that I may
not write. Among other things, I find the idea unappealing, and the days are short.
So the rest of this essay may be considered maliciously suggestive, an ideological
ghost story, at the very least a provocation. But if our society is inherently unequal,
and that inequality is realized and enforced through financial institutions, surely the
regulation of financial institutions ought to reflect that reality? More broadly, how
might we think about political economy writ large after republican pieties have been
washed away in a sea of liquidity, or, to put it more bluntly and in European terms,
after austerity has made it clear what matters?
In hesitantly entertaining such politically incorrect (for heirs of the French
Revolution, blasphemous) thoughts, let us begin innocently enough, with the
Henry Summer Maine, Ancient Law (J.M Dent & Sons, 1861) 170.
Guyora Binder, ‘Legal Metaphors for Self in 20th Century Social Thought,’ in
Looking Back at Law’s Century (Cornell University Press, New York, 2002).
24
25
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example of travel. One sets out armed with a piece of plastic and sometimes a little
book (for Americans, the book is blue). The traveler exhibits her tokens to people,
generally "agents" of governments or corporations. If the tokens are found valid, the
traveller is given airplane rides, hotel rooms, refreshments, and so forth. The
traveler retains the plastic and the book, indeed, need not give anybody anything.
Instead of actual exchange, various accounts on various computers are changed, i.e.,
by "payment" we usually mean a communication and a promise to account. Thus
travel and for that matter economic activities generally take place in "economies of
money."26 Virtually all of what is "exchanged" does not exist in any material sense.
"Exchange" has itself become a metaphor for essentially legal communication about
the terms of financial instruments, promises to alter numbers which, like sports
statistics, express relative standing. All that is solid melts into air, as it were.27
One cannot think of communication (one cannot speak) outside of a culture.
Financial culture is the water in which we all swim, regulators and regulated and
just plain folks. Finance itself is an expression and constitutive of culture; payment
(contract, property, and so forth) is always already cultural. Thus the recent
discovery of "culture" in financial discourse-- as an afterthought, what to do when
the rules fail to keep up with developments in the market -- is wrongheaded. In the
same vein, the imaginary of the lawyers and economists, for whom culture is
understood is something to be confronted by actors, as rule or incentive, is
misleading. Culture was always the question, and culture was always also internal
to the individuals, institutions, modes of interaction that constitute financial
markets.
If culture was always the question, then why has culture come to the fore just
now? What has changed in recent years? For a long time, before the GFC, the
culture of financial elites was both workable and tacit, went without saying (comme
David A. Westbrook, Problematique in Rethinking Financial Markets, The World
Economics Association,
http://rfconference2012.worldeconomicsassociation.org/problematique/.
27 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Joseph Katz ed., Samuel
Moore trans.) (1848) 32.
26
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il faut), and so "culture" was not something that required worrying. Business
communities, like all communities, have their virtues and of course their vices. It is
important to remember, however, that such arrangements are not stable over time
(virtues and vices have histories). So, for example, by the 1930s, New York had
been a financial center for generations; surely business could not have been done
for so long and on such scale if everyone were a cheat and there were no trust. But
the Peccora Commission, or in our time, Eliot Spitzer, were not wrong in their
aspirations to clean up Wall Street, asserting that norms had faded and needed to be
enforced.28 Not even crime is constant. So with regard to British banking, as with
regard to investment banking on Wall Street, knowledgeable commentators report
their sense that social norms have frayed, that business is not what it used to be.
(Corporate lawyers universally do so.) That is, when a commercial culture is
working, and especially when money is being made, the question of culture fades
into the background. When a community's norms lead it to harm itself, culture
comes into question.
So it is because these are hard times -- because our financial thinking or at
least policy failed to prevent disaster -- that we must think anew about financial
culture. We must reconsider whether we still believe what we long thought we
know about financial culture, viz., is it really sensible to think about finance in terms
of the trade of scarce resources, i.e., the exchange of goods, among equals? To shift
examples slightly, assume that you "order" dinner, or better still, "command" it in
French, and your credit card is accepted, that is, the waiter (or "server") and the
kitchen obey your wishes. The restaurant and its staff accept that you are the sort of
person to whom dinner should be brought. Unless you leave a tip in cash on the
table, you do not actually pay for the meal. You send (or sign) a message
authorizing your institutions to credit their institutions. Various back offices handle
28See

e.g., The United States Committee On Banking and Currency, The Pecora
Report: The 1934 Report On the Practices of Stock Exchanges From the “Pecora
Commission,” available at www.archives.gov; see also Adi Ignatius, ‘Eliot Spitzer:
Wall Street's Top Cop,’ (2002) Time Magazine.
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looking out for the restaurant, which looks after its suppliers, its staff, and so forth.
From this perspective the credit card establishes the diner's social standing. Credit
transactions are rather feudal, in the fairly literal sense of a web of obligations and
obedience built upon trust.
There are, of course, other accounts to give of what it means to order dinner.
Those on the left would like to maintain that people get things, or should get things,
because they have done some work. That would be nice, but let me be honest: I do
not work much, and therefore do not assume that wealth is the artifact of labor.
More to the point, I do not work for the waiter, and what work I have done, he does
not know. All he knows is I have plastic, and that is more than enough. Or, to turn
the problem around, feudal lords "worked" too: they fought their kings wars,
struggled with rivals, ran manors, and sired heirs. But it would be foolish to say that
they were obeyed in exchange for their labors.
Those on the right sometimes maintain that capital markets, great engines of
progress and security, require investors. Even though investors do not work, they
bear risk, for which they should be paid. As a professor of finance, I teach this story,
but again, I really do not risk much. I have tenure, and I hope I am not being let onto
a plane to bear risk. In short, neither the ideology of the left nor the ideology of the
right does a very good job of articulating what is happening in an ordinary financial
transaction: on the basis of messages -- in this case, swiping credit cards -- agents
are authorized, or not authorized to act.
As already suggested, this does not sit well with the liberal mind.
Conventionally, we imagine transactions as exchanges among contracting parties
who are legally presumed to be equals. That is, we see economic activity as the
expression of liberty, choice: one chooses to buy or sell. We speak of "free markets"
instead of "command economies" much less "neofeudal obligation." We conceive of
liberty in opposition to status. So the wife, child or slave under the Roman law
(patria potestas) are unfree -- their social position is determined not by their choice,
but by action of law, generally referring to the circumstances of birth or battle. That
is, liberal political economy has often defined itself in opposition to other ways of
Page 13
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social ordering. Maine himself was a scholar of Roman law, and intimately familiar
with the Indian caste system. But to say that 19th century England or the 21st
century US is unlike the Rome of the 12 Tables does not mean that our own selfunderstanding is sufficiently deep, that we have our ideology right enough. The fact
that a world of difference exists between being a "server" today and chattel slavery
in the US in the early 19th century does not mean we should understand restaurant
service in terms of autonomous exchange rather than, literally, service.
As noted, in economies of money, we see webs of obligation without direct
exchange. We see service, indeed, obedience, even if not the right to physical
coercion or outright alienation, as with chattel slavery. In "The Theory of the Firm,"
Ronald Coase was disturbed by the fact that so much economic activity was
governed by hierarchies of command rather than by bargain, a price mechanism.29
He argued that a system of contractual subservience saved transaction costs.
Perhaps, but this led Coase to the uneasy recognition that any economic system -including slavery -- might be justified on the basis of efficiency demonstrated by its
existence.30 Coase took refuge in, of all things, the law. Agency law, in twentieth
century Anglo-American systems, simply did not allow employment agreements for
indentured servitude, and slavery was illegal, so its practice could not be taken as
evidence of a saving of transaction costs.31 But if the question is what should the
law be, i.e., how should we begin thinking about the regulation of financial
institutions, and in particular, their hierarchical exercises of power, "the law" is
hardly an answer. What law?
Much more may be said about the use of "transaction costs" to rescue the
economic imaginary of autonomous and presumptively equal contracting parties,
but more old fashioned and honest words are "privilege," "status," and even "class,"
See R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm,’ (Nov., 1937) 4 Economica, New Series 16,
386-405.
30 See ibid. at 403-04.
31 David A. Westbrook, ‘A Shallow Harbor and a Cold Horizon: The Deceptive
Promise of Modern Agency Law for the Theory of the Firm,’ (2012) 35 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 1369, 1373-75.
29
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understood as a relation to authoritative institutions and especially the social
capital they command. It should go without saying that corporations, including
banks, are -- as the church and the military have always been -- such authoritative
institutions.
Currently polite words for economic status are title, meaning institutional
affiliation, and brand. So an individual may be invited to teach in a university, or run
a large bank, and exercise the authority of that office, because that individual has
achieved a certain reputation among those with the power to appoint, what the
Middle Ages meant by the word "invest." There is an amusing moment, at policy
and academic conferences, when speakers publicly proclaim that they are not
speaking in their institutional capacity. True enough, of course, in the sense that the
presenter is not formally authorized to speak for the institution understood as a
corporate body. But the vast majority of speakers must be legitimated through a
chain of institutional affiliations, or they would not be asked to speak at all. Nobody
besides perhaps great artists speaks purely on their own authority. Titles matter,
hence nametags.
A business attracts custom -- depositors and other investors in a bank -based on a differentiated reputation, secured by the sorts of intellectual property
that make up a brand. But investors generally do not "know" what "their" banks do.
As Jamie Dimon will admit, even bankers are pretty hazy on what their institutions
are doing.32 Investment is usually highly social, based on reputation and commonly
held (hence publicly defensible) belief, and hence the need for credit rating agencies.
From this perspective, handing over a credit card is like showing a letter
from the king, or wearing a uniform that displays an officer's rank. The credit card
establishes a position vis-a-vis a chain of financial institutions, and by extension, the
governments that attempt to back them up, not always successfully. None of this is
very democratic, and in that sense not very modern, and therefore difficult to think,
See U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearing: A
Breakdown in Risk Management: What Went Wrong at JPMorgan Chase?
(Wednesday, June 13, 2012) Testimony of James Dimon.
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but so it goes. Unsurprisingly, financial discourse typically treats payment in terms
of an Arcadian quid pro quo, in spite of the fact that financial activities (collectively,
culture) consists largely of communications about relative social standing defined in
terms of accounting. And, after Enron and Worldcom, the implosion of various
intensively managed financial institutions during the GFC, the Greek scandal, and
now LIBOR, accounting seems to be a rather dubious enterprise.
At this point in the discussion we have sketched a political economy (social
capitalism) founded primarily on economies of money (the exchange of tokens,
rather than goods or services) in which "trade" consists largely of communications
about relative social standing defined in terms of a rather dubious system of
accounting.33 In this context, how might we think about regulating financial
culture?
At least four differences between the regulatory demands of the social
capitalism we in fact have and the orthodoxies of contemporary regulatory
discourse (what both regulators and regulated say) are salient.
First, insofar as economic activity consists of communications that affect
relative standing ("positions") among authoritative institutions, the public/private
distinction is largely effaced. From the bottom up: webs of speech form the public
sphere. The fact that speech is transactional does not somehow make it private.
(The agora is a public space.) From the top down, all of the actors are licensed,
regulated, and generally insured by the government. To quip, all finance is more or

It is worth noting in passing that the supply of tokens is in principle infinite -limited by the willingness to participate (promise, bet, extend credit). But if supply
is indefinitely large, is indeed positively associated with demand, then distribution
under conditions of scarcity are hardly what financial markets, at least, are doing.
This essay therefore could have focused not on the absence of exchange, but the
political character of both supply and demand, and by extension, the social
(cultural) qualities of price, none of which can easily be squared with liberal
theology. As financial markets, especially derivative markets, become more
important to how society operates, political economy should be revised accordingly.
33
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less public, a lesson from the recent wave of bailouts, and once again being
demonstrated in Europe.34
Second, almost all actors at issue in finance are officials, whose authorities
and obligations are defined by law. Banks are institutions authorized to conduct
certain kinds of intermediation. Bankers act not in their own capacity, but as
officers of the bank. The legal capacity to dispose of assets depends on institutional
status and authority, almost never on personal ownership -- even in the case of socalled proprietary trading. Shareholders simply have no legal power to dispose of
corporate assets. Thus the imagination that suffuses financial policy discourse, of
the sheriff attempting to constrain yeoman traders, is silly. Financial policy asks, or
should ask, after the proper relationships among different sorts of bureaucrats,
whose powers are legally defined, whose collective actions allocate assets. The fact
that an economy is neither a command economy nor even socialistic (the state does
not have substantial ownership of key enterprises), does not mean that markets are
not institutionally and legally comprised, and therefore only understood in social
terms.
Third, and by extension from the first two points, the regulator and the object
of regulation need to be understood in terms of one another, reciprocally rather
than antagonistically. Here again the metaphor of sports is instructive. The referee
does not exist without the game. Conversely, games cannot be won without a set of
conventions to determine the bounds of the field, what counts as a point, and the
like. To understand rules -- and regulators, and ultimately law -- as essentially
external to marketplace activity is a common error, but an error nonetheless. It is
legal instruments that are being traded, all the way down.
Fourth, regulators and policy makers and even academics are conceptually
"within" the culture they seek to regulate. To some extent, this is a matter of
biography -- one must know a lot of finance even to follow the conversation.
Incidentally, it is not entirely clear what is meant, in the LIBOR context, by
‘unsecured’ lending. Who needs collateral if obligations are backed by the taxing
power of the state?
34
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Cultural bias is also a matter of interest. The Wheatley Report is quite candid about
the government's wish to preserve the preeminence of London as a financial
center.35 More profoundly, financial market participants have difficulty thinking
about finance in ways other than "like what we've done, only somewhat better."
And, as noted above, financiers, like practitioners of most any art, are good at
thinking about how to do what it is they do -- they are far less good at thinking about
what it means.36
To sketch the image of financial culture that is emerging: contemporary
social capitalism uses more or less competitive markets, operated and overseen by
corporate and governmental officials (bureaucrats) in reciprocal relationships,
within shared webs of understanding, to determine the flow of goods, services, and
most importantly the financial assets (social capital) that largely determine the
power of institutions, including governments, the provision of social services, and
much of the status of individuals (who is rich). If this -- rather than some sort of
fence, within which private actors legally deemed to be equal seek personal gain
through trade, perhaps in the faith that the invisible hand will direct the sum of their
actions to the common weal -- is a plausible description of our capitalism, then what
might be said about financial culture? Financial culture is far more social,
bureaucratic, hierarchical, and intellectually conservative than is commonly
admitted in, for example, the pages of the Wall Street Journal. (One recalls
Schumpeter's thoughts about the end of capitalism, i.e., the entrepreneur giving way
to the manager.37)
What might be said about regulation in such a society? The general impulse
of the law is conservative. In ordinary times, the king wishes to see good order in
his kingdom, whenever and wherever he might reign. Even in times of revolution,
the authority of the law is almost always understood as prior -- the ancien regime
See Wheatley, The Wheatley Review of LIBOR.
A point that runs back at least to Plato.
37 See generally Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (George
Allen & Unwin Publishers 1943).
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has strayed from the true law, and therefore must be overthrown, so that society
may return to the path of righteousness (hence "revolution," a wheel returning to
whence it began).38 So we may assume that the financial regulation required by
social capitalism will be, or should be, custodial in character.
As noted above, the social order has largely been capitalized -- we rely on
portfolio management to ensure the operation of our governments, our payment
systems, the way institutions and individuals operate daily. We rely on
endowments to provide social services, ranging from education to health care to
retirement. In such a deeply capitalistic society, financial markets are essentially
like utilities or weapons systems: disruption of operations cannot be tolerated for
any length of time. From this perspective, the purpose of financial regulation is to
ensure smooth functioning, even at the cost of liquidity and capital formation, of
financial markets in which positions are taken, and by extension, portfolios are
constructed. In short, the shift from entrepreneurial capitalism to social capitalism
implies a corresponding shift, admittedly not yet taken, from permissive regulation
to custodial regulation.
How might one begin to think about custodial regulation? While it is difficult
to think about the context of one's own thought, it is not quite impossible. Much
contemporary anthropology is marked by the acknowledgment that it
fundamentally is "reflexive" rather than objective -- the account of a culture is
always also the account of the writer of the culture. Hence the transformation of
anthropology in the 80’s has been called "writing culture."39 The difficulty in the
anthropological enterprise is acknowledging the self-referential character of the
inquiry, and proceeding nonetheless.40 Something similar might be said -- is being
said -- about the need for financial market regulators to think about the culture that
Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of Western Legal Tradition
(Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1983) 20.
39 See generally George Marcus & James Clifford, Writing Culture: The Poetics and
Politics of Ethnography (University of California Press, California, 1986).
40 As another aside, economics and so finance has not yet really taken the turn to
interpretation that marks the rest of the social sciences and also the humanities.
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they are trying to regulate, yet which forms their own understanding of what it is
that they regulate.
LIBOR itself is reflexive. The respondents are asked at what rate would your
important bank be able to borrow a reasonable sum in a given currency for a
specific tenor at 11:00 am?41 In constructing LIBOR, the BBA, through Thompson
Reuters, asks bankers for their view of their place in the world, asks them to enact
Keynes's beauty pageant on themselves.42 In speculating on the price at which a
bank would be able to borrow a reasonable sum, the LIBOR respondent is forced to
ask himself how (un)desirable is my credit in the context of this currency market?
My friends the anthropologists Doug Holmes and George Marcus have
termed such insider/outsider views of a present situation, like participating in a
LIBOR survey, "paraethnographic."43 Actors in complex contexts like large banks
must articulate their own culture, and their standing within it, to themselves as a
condition of their functioning in the culture, doing their jobs. Although global
finance is an impossibly complex context, those who would act within it must in fact
imagine it somehow, tell themselves some story about it, in order to be able to
navigate -- much as ancient sailors had to have some picture, however incomplete,
of their seas. Rephrased, participants in complex contemporary sites stand in much
See Wheatley at 22.
See John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(Harcourt, Florida, 1953) 156.
43 See Douglas R. Holmes and George E. Marcus, Collaborative imperatives: A
Manifesto, of sorts, for the re-imagination of the classic scene of fieldwork encounter,
in Collaborators Collaborating: Counterparts in Anthropological Knowledge and
International Research Relations, (Monica Konrad ed., 2012) 126-43; Douglas R.
Holmes & George E. Marcus, Cultures of Expertise and the Management of
Globalization: Toward the Re-functioning of Ethnography, in Global Assemblages:
Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems, (Aihwa Ong & Stephen J.
Collier eds., 2005) 235-52; Douglas R. Holmes & George E. Marcus, Fast Capitalism:
Para-Ethnography and the Rise of the Symbolic Analyst, in Frontiers of Capital,
Ethnographic Reflections on the New Economy, (Melissa S. Fisher & Greg Downey
eds., 2006) 33-57; Douglas R. Holmes & George E. Marcus, ‘Collaboration Today and
the Re-Imagination of the Classic Scene of Fieldwork Encounter,’ (2008) 1
Collaborative Anthropologies 136, 170.
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the same relationship to their own cultures as traditional anthropologists stood in
relation to native cultures.
Not only do actors describe their contexts to themselves, in so doing, they
help constitute the context. For present example, LIBOR is traded upon. The beauty
contest establishes standards of beauty. Nor is LIBOR the only place where we
observe financial conversation operating to create the conditions under which
finance is done. Consider inflation targeting: central banks announce not only their
objectives, but the means by which they hope those objectives will be achieved, in a
self-conscious effort to have those objectives priced in and traded upon, in a
communicative circle.44
A paraethnographic perspective, i.e., a conversational style of anthropology,
could provide some grasp on contemporary contexts, and especially on how
complicated bureaucracies like banking generate social, economic, and inevitably
political realities.45 The opportunity for anthropologists, and perchance bankers
and their regulators, is to make critical use of paraethnographic perspectives to
accomplish not the interests of their interlocutors, but their own objectives, whether
it be complex evaluation or the maintenance of sound markets. If regulators were to
approach their jobs through a paraethnographic understanding of financial
institutions, then the regulatory relationship, especially with regard to prudential
regulation, would be subtly but pretty profoundly reconfigured.
The Bank of England's Andrew Haldane recently gave a very fine speech at
the Federal Reserve's annual meeting in Jackson Hole.46 In it, Haldane argued that
financial regulation, and specifically the Basel process, had grown far too complex -and that such complexity was counterproductive. So Haldane argued that
compliance with norms should rely less on elaborate articulation of rules, and rely
See Holmes, The Path of Law.
See e.g., Westbrook, Navigators of the Contemporary.
46 See Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability and member of the
Financial Policy Committee, Bank of England, address at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City’s 36th economic policy symposium, The Changing Policy Landscape
(August 12, 2012).
44
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more on the judgment of experienced officials. In terms of the common law
tradition, Haldane argued that it was time for regulators to shift their approach from
law toward equity. One might also make an analogy to perennial argument between
rule-based and principle-based approaches to accounting. Haldane was not too
explicit about what bank regulation would look like under such circumstances, but it
seems fair to imagine that there would many discussions in which regulators asked
actors to convince them why their practices were safe, and their portfolios sound.
Another analogy might be drawn to a start up business, perhaps a technology
company, which seeks early stage investment. The onus is on the leaders of the
young business to explain to potential investors why theirs is a good idea, worthy of
realization. The regulator of an important financial operation should be considered
invested, under the motto, "If you fail, I fail."
The argument here is not nearly as abstract as it may appear. To
recapitulate: as the GFC has demonstrated, vast numbers of tax dollars may be
spent, unemployment may rise, growth falter, and the host of institutions that rely
on pools of assets, from family retirement and education funds to sovereign debt,
may be shaken. Relationships may fray and individual human possibilities may be
diminished. Contemporary societies depend on well functioning financial markets
much as they depend on electricity, hence "social capitalism."47 To be blunt, the
(orthodox) understanding of financial markets as the bounded interaction of
essentially private actors (the understanding with which discussions of culture
generally begin) is both intellectually primitive and politically impoverished.
Understanding finance in human terms -- social capitalism -- should cause one to
understand regulation in explicitly custodial terms, in which bankers and their
regulators come to mutually agreed understanding on how to manage assets. Thus
the relationship between regulator and regulated could be transformed, from one of

47

See Westbrook, Problematique.
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opposition to mutually reinforcing, and interdependent, participation in the custody
of social assets.48
A custodial approach to regulation should engender, within regulatory
relationships, the sensitivity and tough mindedness traditionally associated with
trust obligations.49 From this perspective, regulators might think of what happened
at Barclays and many of the shenanigans of the last years not just as actions of a few
"bad apples," or even as more general expressions of a corrupt institutional culture,
but as a kind of personal and professional betrayal, for which the appropriate
response is anger. If management deceived key equity investors in a company,
would we not expect to see such managers replaced, and in the extreme case, the
company merged out of existence? It would have been completely understandable
had the radical interventions of 2008 and since resulted in the dissolution of the
corporations involved: the discharge of management, the forfeit of equity, and the
abolition of the brands. While some banks, especially smaller banks and especially
in the US, were resolved, over and over again and in jurisdiction after jurisdiction,
banking, which is necessary, was confused with specific banks, which are
replaceable. And banks, as Bagehot taught a long time ago, should conduct
themselves with the understanding that they are replaceable.50 And even if a society
does not have the stomach to replace its banks, it should at least have the will to
replace its bankers.
From a paraethnographic perspective, however, there is a structural reason
to dissolve banks or at least discharge management: if management is no longer
trustworthy, then the paraethnographic regulation, founded on trust, is not possible,
The elegant exchange of letters between Barclays Chairman Marcus Agius and the
FSA's Adair Turner is exactly what I'm NOT talking about. See The Exchange of
Letters Between Lord Turner, Chairman of the FSA, and Marcus Agius, Chairman of
Barclays, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmtreasy/481/4
8111.htm.
49 See e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928) (A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place . . .).
50 See Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street.
48
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and the institution cannot be licensed or backed by the state. Society should replace
its bankers with more trustworthy, careful, or at least blameless, mandarins.
Turning to specifics, and the immediate occasion for this essay: what does a
custodial understanding of regulation mean for the efforts to "fix" LIBOR? Most
proposals for reform, including Wheatley, treat LIBOR as if it were a device like a
thermometer that directly measured an aspect of the natural world, and Barclays
and others tampered with the instrument, so that it gave an inaccurate reading. But
LIBOR doesn't measure anything outside the social context of its formation. As
every teacher knows, at the end of the day, performance on a test is always about
the test and maybe the class, but only tangentially about the truth. Similarly, LIBOR
is a ritual for expressing sentiment about the cost of capital and therefore the
relative standing of financial institutions in the present environment. But nothing is
measured. LIBOR estimates are provided even in the absence of trades, that is, on a
speculative basis.51
Thus LIBOR wasn't untrue in the way that a faulty thermometer is inaccurate.
The ritual was performed, and the BBA did generate a very important number on a
daily basis. LIBOR was untrue in the sense of dishonest. Asked "what do you
believe," players lied. That is, the virtue at issue is not the mechanical one of
accuracy, but the moral virtue of honesty. The question is not how to "regulate" the
culture from somewhere outside the culture; the question is how do we collectively
construct contexts in which we wish to participate, that is, a social capitalism of
which we're happy to be members.
Various proposals for LIBOR reform may go some way toward "cleaning up"
the LIBOR process, either by reputational cost and the threat of criminal
prosecution,52 by automatic market mechanisms,53 or by enhanced transparency

See Wheatley at 6-7.
See Wheatley at 22, 74.
53 See Frank Partnoy, Make Banks Pay if They Cheat on LIBOR (July 15, 2012) The
Financial Times.
51
52
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coupled with ex post sanctions.54 And it may well be that such mechanisms would
be morally instructive, that is, would cause bank officials to make good faith efforts
to conform. At the same time, any reform that seeks more conformity to elite
consensus is also by definition conservative. Moreover, as nicely outlined by the
Wheatley Review, any alternatives, comprised by different inputs, would entail a
somewhat different perspective on the cost of money. And the British banking
industry thinks that its perspective is best. Moreover, market participants use this
number, so that shows that LIBOR must be fulfilling a demand, right? And besides,
these expectations are now wired into countless contracts, with more being made
regularly, and radical change might disrupt the markets. Unsurprisingly, the
Wheatley Review urges caution. Too much change would not be prudent. So what
started out as a first mover advantage and was then buttressed by path dependency
has become legitimated, and even needs to be protected. Or, in another language, an
innovation has become a habit, which became a custom and eventually a norm
attended by the lawgiver, here the British Parliament. Unsurprisingly and as noted
above, the lawgiver is disinclined to change.
More than the usual interests of immediate stakeholders are at issue. The
global order that allows the operation of credit cards and so much else seems to
require LIBOR or something very much like it. Financial institutions need to be able
to contractually account for the cost of money, and for this, they require a
benchmark. So what is needed is a LIBOR that can be believed, so that confidence in
banking will be restored. Banking needs to reform its culture; we must become
good sports. It is not at all clear that conservative responses will suffice -- the GFC
was largely due to the triumph of economic orthodoxies, and so reaffirmation of
such orthodoxies is unlikely to be enough.55

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & David S. Evans, Replacing the LIBOR with a Transparent
and Reliable Index of Interbank Borrowing, (Sept. 2012) Comments on the Wheatley
Review of LIBOR Initial Discussion Paper.
55 See generally David A. Westbrook, Out of Crisis: Rethinking Our Financial Markets
(Paradigm Publishers, Colorado, 2009).
54
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For this reason, it makes sense to base financial regulation on the
acknowledgment of hierarchy and in particular the power of financial institutions,
rather than a spurious claim that financial officials are merely private actors who
are to act within bounds arguably set by lawyers, and in rational accordance with
the disincentives of reputational cost, as the economists unconvincingly have it.
Instead, through a paraethnographic encounter with their regulators, leaders of
financial institutions could assist in the design of their own constraints, could shape
the terms of their service. And financial leaders, like leaders in other realms, must
stand or fall by their success. We may yet imagine LIBOR reform, and what we have
learned from the financial crisis more generally, in happy terms. Bankers and their
regulators could come to recognize that they are profoundly privileged, and as such,
have great obligations. The current culture of disingenuous reporting, pro forma
compliance with byzantine and contested rules, and perennially insufficient
oversight could be replaced by a more reciprocal relationship in which those who
act and those who authorize and ultimately insure speak earnestly and candidly
about their worlds. Together these elites could exercise their power wisely,
navigate a prudent course forward. Honest conversations about worlds dimly
imaginable could lead to good policy in spite of unavoidable uncertainty. The
people would be grateful for the custody of their institutions. The ship of state
would make good, but not rash, progress.
Even in such a well-governed financial order, sometimes an institution would
fail, and the taxing power of the state would have to be used to sustain the viability
of the order. At issue, then, would also be the nature of the failure. Was
management unworthy? As we have seen, sometimes an institution or an entire
industry may lose sight of its own virtues, a story of decadence and decline easily
told in London and New York. When the privileged abuse their trust, they would be
removed from office, and their responsibility (and attendant wealth and social
standing) transferred to more worthy mandarins.
But the privileged would not often abuse their trust. People rarely willingly
leave their class for a lower one. Thus a paraethnographic, conversational, and
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reciprocal understanding of the regulatory relationship could go a long way toward
making banking a more virtuous enterprise. Presently empty promises to reform
could be made serious by establishing contexts in which elites were answerable to
other elites, at pain of losing their offices and so their status, and thenceforth having
to live small.
Perhaps, but insofar as this provocation is also a ghost story, let us consider
two darker courses of regulatory development. In the GFC and lately the LIBOR
scandal, the fact that key financial institutions strayed from the commercial virtues
traditional in their business (monitoring risk, honesty, and so forth) has led to a
concern for culture, meaning the reassertion of traditional norms. That is, the
overwhelming response to recent financial crises has been conceptually
conservative. But perhaps a conservative response is insufficient? Suppose the
world has changed enough that calls for transparency, for obvious instance, will do
little to avert the fire next time?
In Macbeth, Macbeth says
I dare do all that may become a man
He who does more, is none.56
Macbeth of course begs the question: what becomes a man? What are the virtues
appropriate to a Scottish nobleman? So it is with banking. If we think of banking as
a business, and our imaginary of "business" is fundamentally based on sole
proprietorship, then the purpose of banking is to make money within the bounds of
the law. But if we acknowledge that our capitalism is deeply social and banking in
particular is custodial and the economy of money is in important respects new, such
simple answers will not suffice.
Surely financial markets are in need of reform. But the financial world is
necessarily somewhat blind to itself. The Delphic injunction, know thyself, has not

56

William Shakespeare, Macbeth (McMillan & Co., London, 1871) 17.
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gotten any easier. So it is hard for the financial policy community to think deeply
about what kind of financial markets we as a society want, for student debt or
housing or anything else.
These are essentially aesthetic, in the philosophical sense of the word,
questions. Out of Crisis used the metaphor of games to talk about market
regulation.57 In both markets and games, different kinds of rules favor different
kinds of competition, and foster different kinds of outcomes. So what kind of rule
sets, informing what sorts of participation, do we want banking to have? In what
kind of game do we want Barclays and its kin to be good sports?
As suggested above, we can imagine a world in which bankers and their
regulators have long, honest conversations about how different kinds of financial
games -- institutions and their markets -- should be played, and what were the
advantages and risks attendant upon this or that way of doing things. That would
not be our current situation. There is reason to be skeptical about the capacity of
elites in advanced markets to have the sort of publicly minded conversation
suggested here. It is worth remembering that Macbeth is a tragedy. Macbeth
overreaches, and there has been a lot of that in recent years, at Barclays and
elsewhere. So although we may imagine what custodial regulation would look like,
it may be difficult if not impossible to achieve in fact. The imagination of banks as
"private" actors who are monitored by "the government" is simply too deeply
embedded. And in due course, we will again watch "private" actors do in principle
unnecessary harm to their, and our, communities.
Our situation may be tragic in another sense. Cultures and institutions may
themselves be wrong in the very exercise of their virtues. Americans like to believe
that if one does the right thing, things will go well. But the tragic perspective is that
one may do the right thing, or what is honestly believed to be right, and things may
go very badly. It is not difficult for an American Southerner of German descent to
recall that nations may march off to misguided wars. As already noted, a great deal
See Westbrook, Out of Crisis, Chapter 7 (Metaphors For Thinking Socially About
Capitalism).
57
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of the GFC was due not to misfeasance but the enthusiastic use of the substantial
accomplishments of post-war finance. Just suppose, contra the Introduction, that
we need not enforce or return to the virtues of finance, but that the virtues of
finance are just the danger we should fear?
More specifically, let us assume that, through considerable collective efforts,
LIBOR is reformed (and we agree on global accounting standards and an
international insolvency regime) and, as a result of such policy diligence, faith in
global banking is renewed. Presumably this will strengthen and extend our financial
culture. Would this be a good thing?
In the US, banks are concentrated, inequality is stratospheric by our own
historical standards, and unemployment is high while growth is slow. Perhaps
worst of all, especially after Citizens United, political outcomes are openly discussed
as assets.58 In Europe, Martin Wolfe reports that banked assets are equal to 350%
of GDP. 59 Due to demographics and otherwise, prospects for growth are dim.
Wolfgang Munchau speculates that banking union, and ultimately the institutional
apparatus required to secure European financial institutions and national budgets,
will supersede both the member states and European institutions. 60 This would
amount to a Europe 2.0, explicitly enacted to preserve finance. That is, finance will
have become constitutional.
The reemergence of naked privilege -- defined in terms of bureaucratic
standing rather than noble birth -- may be a change of the longue duree. Perhaps we
are watching Marx backwards, the slow motion and technocratic victory of a new
sort of financial class, rather than the revolutionary violence of the proletariat. It is
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010). My thoughts on the
decision are available in, ‘If not a commercial republic? Political economy in the
United States after Citizens United.’ See David A. Westbrook, ‘If not a commercial
republic? Political economy in the United States after Citizens United,’ (2011) 1 U.
Louisville L. Rev. 50.
59 See Martin Wolf, You Can’t Measure An Economy’s Performance on Recovery Alone
(October, 2012) The Financial Times.
60 See Wolfgang Munchau, The Eurozone Crisis Is Not Finished (Febrarury 3, 2013)
The Financial Times.
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not at all clear how desirable the society under construction is, even if recent
experience in airports ("Our platinum, diamond and gold passengers may now
board through the priority boarding lane") suggests it may be an inevitable
corollary of doing business on a global scale. But surely nobody with democratic
republican sentiments can welcome such developments? In this much, at least, the
Occupy Wall Street protesters were correct.
Nor is it clear how stable a global economy of money might be. The number
of financial crises in recent years gives one pause. Surely there must be practical
limits to the level of abstraction, the scale, interconnection, and general complexity
of our institutions? And would not LIBOR reform, indeed would not almost any
successful financial reform, only increase the scale and complexity of our
institutions, with the attendant alienation and danger of catastrophe? From this
perspective, financial policy may well be a noble enterprise; tragedy requires
nobility. So perhaps the regulation of financial institutions is like worrying about
the steering gear on the Titanic. Either we fail to fix it, and remain adrift. Or we
succeed in fixing it, and hasten on.
Even then, one should try to remember, some folks always survive.
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